TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

Citations to Opinions Below 1
Jurisdiction 3
Statutes Involved 3
Questions Presented 3
Statement 5
Reason for Granting Writ 7
Conclusion 8
Order of the Court 9
Memorandum and Order 9
Order of the Court 11
Order of the Court 12
Order of the Court 12
Memorandum 13
Order 17
Order 18
Memorandum 19
Order 26
Decision of Sixth Circuit Court 27
Order Denying Rehearing 29

CITATIONS

Cases

Burt v City of New York 156 F 2d 791, 792 Bottom
Elk Valey Coal Co. v Thompson 150 S.W. 817
Monroe v Pape 365 U.S. 167
North City Area-Wide Council, Inc. v Romney 469 F 2d 1326 (1972)
Rodriquez v Barcelo 358 F Supp 43 (1973)
Scher v Board of Education of West Orange 424 F 741, 744

STATUTES

U.S.C. 28 1361

U.S.C. 42 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, 3301, 3303

Constitutional Provisions

Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments

Civil Rights Acts

All Applicable

Miscellaneous

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 (c)

A corporation, especially a membership corporation, may be deemed a "citizen" for various purposes. Oneida County Forest Preserve Council v. Wehle 128 N.E. 2d 282

Petitioner, Covington Housing Development Corporation is a corporation, and therefore, it is said, it cannot claim for itself the liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. Accepted in the proper sense, this is true. . . . But it has business and property for which it claims protection. The Corporation is threatened with destruction through the unwarranted compulsion which respondents have exercised . . . . and this Court has gone very far to protect against loss threatened by such action. . . . Petitioners ask protection against arbitrary, unreasonable, and unlawful interference. . . . Pierce v Society of Sisters of Holy Names 268 U.S. 1070. Terrace v Thompson 263 U.S. 197.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM 1975

NO. _____

COVINGTON HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORP., ET. AL. PETITIONERS

VS.

CITY OF COVINGTON, ET. AL. RESPONDENTS

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

---

* * *

Now comes petitioner, Eddie Thompson, Jr., on behalf of the Covington Housing Development Corporation and Eddie Thompson, Jr., and pray that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit entered in the above styled case on April 23, 1975; petition for rehearing denied on June 5, 1975.

Citations to Opinions Below

I. The opinion of Judge Mac Swinford granting the City's motion to dismiss was granted because plaintiffs did not submit a brief opposing the motion. The reason plaintiffs did not submit a brief is that the City's attorney, Mr. Wagner, and defendant and attorney, Mr. Condit, prevented plaintiffs' attorney, Mr. Clifford Fennell, from submitting a brief; a fact the City's attorney acknowledges in his affidavit to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Upon appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court ruled that no appeal was taken. Sixth circuit did not rule on the City's motion to strike from plaintiff-appellants brief any and all reference to the December 18, 1973, order of the District Court dismissing the City of Covington as a party defendant. The opinion of the Sixth Circuit appears on page 27.

II. The opinion of Judge Mac Swinford granting summary judgment to defendants was not supported by any facts or law. IN fact, his recital of Elk Valley Coal Co. v Thompson 150 Ky 614, 150 S.W. 817, supports plaintiff-appellants. In this instance, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has considered none of the facts presented by petitioner and has refused to undertake an independent review of the record as required by federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56 (c)

III. The opinion of Judge Mac Swinford dismissing claim by Thompson is equally not supported by fact or law. The Honorable Judge Mac Swinford had not reached the conclusion (that Thompson had not stated a case) when he erroneously dismissed the City of Covington at the cost of plaintiffs, Covington Housing Development Corporation and Eddie Thompson, Jr. The reviewing court did not take an independent review of the record.

IV. Last, but not least, is the fact that an order dismissing Carlton and Wooten was before the Court of Appeals, and the Reviewing Court made no mention of an appeal from that order. Mr. Kinnaird, in his affidavit, had already admitted that Roger Carlton may have taken the action alleged in the complaint and that he no longer worked for the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was entered on April 23, 1975. Petition for rehearing was denied on June 5, 1975. The jurisdiction of this court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254 (1) and any other applicable section.

STATUTES INVOLVED

The Federal Statutes involved are 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, etc. (Act of April 20, 1971) and Civil Rights Act of 1875; 42 U.S.C. 3301, 3303, etc. (Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Act of 1966)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. (a) Did plaintiffs appeal from order dismissing the City of Covington?

(b) Under federal programs or projects initiated under 42 U.S.C. 3301, etc., is the City a desired party?

(c) Could defendants prevail, where they illegally pressured plaintiffs' counsel into not answering motion?

(d) Can City illegally terminate a model Cities project in order to deny a black person, or anyone, employment in said project?

II. (a) What proof was there in the original record that Thomson was not authorized to file this suit on behalf of the Corporation?

(b) In a case where defendants had sued plaintiff earlier in his representative capacity, could defendants later claim that agent did not have the power to sue in his representative capacity?

(c) Was Broadus Blythe a managing agent?

(d) The District Court made reference to depositions and interrogatives of other participants in the operation. Were they board members? Who were they?

(e) In what instances were there "internal corporate dissensions" regarding the propriety of this suit?

(f) Were Thompson and others injured by the illegal phasing out of this Model Cities Project, in that the City is still withholding Thompson's salary and that of his staff members?

(g) Would Corporation benefit by this suit?

(h) Did Sixth Circuit Court seek to render judgment which is just, legal, and proper?

III. (a) Did Thompson state the same cause of action as the Covington Housing Development Corporation?

(b) Was Thompson injured by the illegal phasing out of the project?

(c) In a Model Cities project which is illegally phased out for racial reasons, would Thompson, as agent (employee), be entitled to back wages?

(d) Can City of Covington and City Officials, for racial reasons, force me into involuntary bankruptcy by illegally with holding funds that I had already earned by contract?

(e) Can defendants use fraud, or any means available, to deprive Thompson of his constitutional rights?

(f) What did defendants plead regarding Thompson?

IV. (a) Were Roger Carlton and Hobart Wooten Desired parties?

(b) Did plaintiffs seek administrative remedies?

(c) Could Roger Carlton and Hobart Wooten cause a Model Cities project to be illegally phased out because the City Manager was opposed to a black person as director of said project?

STATEMENT

This is a suit by a Kentucky Corporation and Eddie Thompson, Jr., severally and jointly. This suit was commenced under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, against the City of Covington, Kentucky, several City Officials, and two HUD Representatives for their arbitrary and capricious actions in phasing out the Covington Housing Development Corporation for racial reasons.

Plaintiffs broadened their pleadings to include 42 U.S.C. 3301, 3303, etc.

The City of Covington, defendants Grimm, Saegeser, Simpson, Bowman, Wermelling, Royster, Hedrick, Wolfe, Condit, and Woods moved to dismiss, citing, Monroe vPape 365 U.S. 167.

Mr. Wagner and Mr. Condit prevented plaintiffs' attorney, Mr. Clifford Fennell, from answering motions.

City Officials gave frivilous and unmeritorious answers and asked to take depositions of plaintiffs, Covington Housing Development Corporation and Eddie Thompson, Jr.

Mr. Wagner and Mr. Condit prevented plaintiffs' attorney from attending the depositions, and Mr. Fennell instructed Thompson to go ahead, assuring Thompson that he would be present.

Mr. Wagner and Mr. Condit knew that Mr. Fennell would not appear, and they tricked Broadus Blythe into giving his deposition. They knew that Mr. Blythe was not a managing agent and could not speak for the Corporation.

Defendants then came in with an affirmative defense that the Covington Housing Development Corporation had not authorized the filing of this suit and should be dismissed; which was not true, and which they did not prove.

Mr. Blythe was not authorized to speak for the Corporation.

Judge Mac Swinford granted defendants Summary Judgment. He did not take into consideration any of the argument presented by plaintiffs.

Even if the Corporation had not, or did not ratify this suit, the managing agent, Eddie Thompson, Jr., would have been able to maintain this suit in the name of the Corporation. Elk Valley Coal Co. v Thompson 150 S.W. 817.

For what cause Summary Judgment was granted, or how the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals could concur, is unknown; but the reasons are inconsistent with Kentucky State Laws or Federal Laws.

This decision leaves many important issues unclear. It makes a mockery of our State and Federal Constitutions.

On what bases the lower courts concluded that if this complaint was profferred by Thompson, it had no merit, give one an unequivocal feeling that some men do not respect our Constitutions.

Judge Mac Swinford's decision to grant motion to dismiss Carlton and Wooten was so ridiculous that the Sixth Circuit Court was reluctant to even address that issue, even though it was argued before them.

While Wooten and Carlton are respondents, based on the appeals, we feel that the U.S. Attorneys office supports our position.

REASON FOR GRANTING WRIT

The lower court's decision was so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. The Sixth Circuit Court's sanctioning of such departure calls for an exercise of this Court's power of supervision.

The plaintiffs' constitutional rights were violated. The phasing out of a Model Cities project, without citizen participation, to prevent a black from having a job in the project is illegal. North City Area-Wide Council, Inc. v Romney 469 F 2d 1326 (1972); Rodriquez v Barcelo 358 F Supp 43 (1973)

If a complaint charges a state officer not only with deliberately misinterpreting a statute against a plaintiff, but also with purposely singling him out alone for that misinterpretation, it is good against demurer. Burt v City of New York 156 F 2d 791, 792 Bottom

A case brought under the Civil Rights Act should not be dismissed at the pleading stage unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his claim. Scher v Board of Education of West Orange 424 F 741, 744

Where there has been no formal ratification by the Board of Directors of a corporation at a regular meeting of an unauthorized act of an agent; the question of whether individual acquiescence of failure to disaffirm amounts to ratification depends on the facts of the case, and where the unauthorized act is beneficial to the corporation, and the directors have individual knowledge of it, slight evidence shows ratification, but where the corporation does not derive any benefits from the unauthorized act, or it is doubtful if it has received benefit and no third party person has suffered loss, evidence of ratification by individual acquiescense or failure to repudiate must be clearly shown. Elk Valley Coal Co. v Thompson 150 S.W. 817.

Even if the City was dismissed, 42 U.S.C. 1983 gives a remedy-action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceedings for redress to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official's abuse of his position whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it. Monroe v Pape 365 U.S. 167.

Under 42 U.S.C. 3301, 3303, the City would be a desired party.

The approval by the court below of the trial court's decision makes a travesty of the plain meaning of 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983; 42 U.S.C. 3301, 3303; 28 U.S.C. 1361.

CONCLUSION

This court should grant the petition for Certiorari and hear the issues raised in these important areas of Civil Rights and Federally funded programs.

Respectfully submitted,

Eddie Thompson Jr.

EDDIE THOMPSON, JR., Pro Se

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
COVINGTON

No. 1752

COVINGTON HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET. AL. PLAINTIFFS

V.

CITY OF COVINGTON, ET. AL. DEFENDANTS

ORDER

The defendants are given until Monday, December 10, 1973 at 4:00 P.M., to file answers or otherwise plead in this action.

November 15,1973 Mac Swinford Judge
(Retyped Copy)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

NO. 1752
COVINGTON HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL PLAINTIFFS

v.

CITY OF COVINGTON, ET AL DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This civil rights action commenced under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the City of Covington and numerous municipal officials alleges racial discrimination in the operation of the local Housing Development Corporation.

The City has moved to dismiss on the ground that the Civil Rights Act does not contemplate actions against municipalities. The plaintiffs have been afforded an opportunity for submission of briefs and the record is before the court for decision.

It is well-settled that a municipality is not a "person" within the purview of the Civil Rights Act. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961),

> "the Court held that 42 U.S.C. 1983. . . was intended to provide private parties a cause of action for abuses of official authority which resulted in the deprivation of constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities. At the same time, however, the Court held that a municipality is not a 'person' within the meaning of 1983." Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1973).

Accord, City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S.507 (1973); Patrum v. City of Greensburg, Kentucky, 6th Cir., 419 F. 2d 1300 (1969), cert; denied 397 U.S. 990 (1970); Deane Hill Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville, 6th Cir., 379 F. 2d 321 (1967), cert. denied 389 U.S. 975 (1967).

It is ordered that the motion to dismiss filed by the City of Covington be and the same hereby is sustained and the the complaint, insofar as it applies to the City of Covington, be and the same hereby is dismissed at the cost of the plaintiffs.

December 18, 1973 /s/ Mac Swinford, Judge
(Retyped Copy)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
COVINGTON

NO. 1752

COVINGTON HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL — PLAINTIFFS

V.

CITY OF COVINGTON, ET AL — DEFENDANTS

ORDER

The motion of the Unites States for a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requesting that the defendants, HUD representative Roger Carlton and HUD Representative Hobart Wooten, not be required to answer interrogatories served upon the United States Attorney pending disposition of the motion of the United States to dismiss the action as to these defendants is sustained.

These two named defendant need not answer interrogatories until a ruling of the court is had on the pending motion to dismiss the complaint as to each of them. In the event the motion to dismiss the complaint is overruled, they will be given the thirty days from the date of the order-over-ruling the motion to file answers to the interrogatories.

May 13, 1974 — /s/ Mac Swinford, Judge
(Retyped Copy)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
COVINGTON

NO.1752

COVIGTON HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL — PLAINTIFFS

v.

CITY OF COVINGTON, ET AL — DEFENDANTS

ORDER

This case is set down for hearing on all pending motions on Tuesday, July 16, 1974, at 1:00 P.M.

June 27, 1974 — /s/ Mac Swinford, Judge
(Retyped Copy)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
COVINGTON

NO.1752

COVINGTON HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL — PLAINTIFFS

V.

CITY OF COVINGTON, ET AL — DEFENDANTS

ORDER

It is ordered and adjudged herein as follows:

1) The motion of the United States to dismiss as to defendants Carlton and Wooten is sustained;

2) The complaint, insofar as it applies to Roger Carlton and Hobart Wooten, is dismissed at the cost of the plaintiffs.

See Memorandum.

June 27, 1974 /s/ Mac Swinford, Judge
(Retyped Copy)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
COVINGTON

NO. 1752

COVINGTON HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,ET AL PLAINTIFFS

v.

CITY OF COVINGTON, ET AL DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM

The complaint in this civil rights action alleges that on October 5, 1972, the plaintiff contracted with the City of Covington for the development of a housing complex pursuant to the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act, 42 U.S.C. 3301, et seq. Because the Executive Director of the housing authority was a Negro, however, city officials deliberately misrepresented certain facts to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (hereinafter: HUD) in a successful attempt to block further funding of the project. The publicity surrounding the curtailment and the defendants' false allegations of an overspent budget defamed the character of the Housing Development Corporation Director, Eddie Thompson, Jr.

The plaintiff seeks damages and/or an injunction directing the revival of the project.

On December 18, 1973, the complaint was dismissed as to the City of Covington on the ground that a municipality is not a "person" within the contemplation of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1981, et seq. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973). The record is now before the court on the motion by the United States to dismiss HUD employees Roger Carlton and Hobart Wooten for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiff has responded that jurisdiction is empowered as to these defendants under 28 U.S.C. 1361 and 5 U.S.C. 701, et seq.

A preliminary appraisal of the complaint indicates that Carlton and Wooten are not proper parties defendant. Wooten is deceased while Carlton is no longer a departmental employee. Further, although the complaint demands substantial damages in lieu of renewed funding, the plaintiff has name as defendants only the area HUD representatives. These individuals clearly lack "the ability and authority . . . to effectuate the relief which the (plaintiff) seeks." Ceballos v. Shaughnessy, 352 U.S. 599, 603 (1957); see also Williams v. Fenning, 332 U.S. 490 (1947); Boles v. greeneville Housing Authority, 6th Cir., 468 F. 2d 476 (1972); 7 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 1622; contra Rodriguez v. Barcelo, D. P.R., 358 F. Supp. 43, 48-49 (1973).

Even if accorded an opportunity to remedy this deficiency, the allegations of the complaint reveal this action as one against the United States and thus barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

It is well settled that the United States, its agencies, and officers are not suable in the absence of its consent. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907). The identity of the defendant is ascertained not from the style of the complaint but by the manner in which the judgment would be framed. Simons v. Vinson, 968 (1968). Where, as here, the relief sought would require affirmative government action or deplete public funds, the action is one against the United States.

> "The general rule is that a suit is against a sovereign if 'the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration,' Land V. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947), or if the effect of the judgment would be 'to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp. . . . 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949). Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963).

See also Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57 (1963); Sierra Club v. Hickel, 6th Cir., 467 F. 2d 1048, 1051 (1972), cert. denied 411 U.S. 920 (1973); Arthur v. Fry, E.D. Tenn., 300 F. Supp. 622 (1969). An exception to this rule prevails where it is alleged that "the federal official acted beyond his statutory authority or. . . in an unconstitutional manner of under a statute which is constitutionally void." Rothgeb v. Statts, S.D. Ohio, 56 F.R.D. 559, 561 (1972); Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 647 (1972). Unlike the arbitrary and capricious action attacked in other actions commenced under the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act, North City Area-Wide Council, Inc. v Romney, 3d Cir., 428 F. 2d 754, 758 (1970); Coalition

for United Community Action v. Romney, N.D. Ill., 316 F. Supp. 742 (1970), the complaint in the case at bar bears no suggestion of an excessive or unconstitutional exercise of authority. Even if it be determined that federal officials acted erroneously, the relief demanded patently requires "affirmative action on the part of the sovereign or the expenditure of funds from the public treasury." Rothgeb v. Statts, supra; Benson v. City of Minneapolis, D. Minn., 286 F. Supp. 614, 619-620 (1968).

While the above conclusion is alone sufficient for dismissal, it should additionally be noted that the plaintiff has failed to pursue administrative remedies. The exhaustion requirement is a judicial construct intended to "allow an administrative agency to perform functions within its special competence–to make a factual record, to apply its expertise, and to correct its own errors so as to moot judicial controversies." Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969). Although not literally incorporated into either statute, it is well settled that the doctrine is an inherent part of both the Administrative Procedure Act, Holland Furnace Company v. Percell, W.D. Mich., 125 F. Supp. 74, 80 (1954), and 28 U.S.C. 1361, Beale v. Blount, 5th Cir., 461 F. 2d 1133, 1137 (1973); Richardson v. United States, 3d Cir., 465 F. 2d 844, 849 (1972), cert. denied 410 U.S. 955 (1973).

The only suggestion of an attempted administrative exhaustion is the revelation in the memorandum opposing dismissal of a letter of complaint in March, 1973, and other unspecified contacts with the Louisville, Kentucky, HUD office. Although hopeless administrative attempts for redress are

unnecessary, Ogletree v. McNamara, 6th Cir., 449 F. 2d 93 99 (1971); Nemitz v. Norfolk and Western Railway Co., N.D. Ohio, 287 F. Supp. 221, 230 (1968), the plaintiff in the case at bar has alleged neither such futility nor an attempted compliance with the department's "administrative remedies validly established by regulation. . . . "National Lawyers Guild v. Brownell, D.C. Cir., 255 F. 2d 552, 557 (1955), cert. denied 351 U. S. 927 (1956); 24 C.F.R. Parts I and II.

An order will be entered sustaining the motion filed by the United States to dismiss defendants Carlton and Wooten.

June 27, 1974 /s/ Mac Swinford, Judge
(Retyped Copy)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
COVINGTON

CIVIL NO. 1752

COVINGTON HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL PLAINTIFFS

VS:

CITY OF COVINGTON, ET AL DEFENDANTS

ORDER

On July 16, 1974, came the plaintiffs by Clifford R. Fennell, their attorney and the defendants by Charles Wagner and Joseph Condit, their attorneys.

The Court heard counsel and being advised reserved its ruling on all pending motions.

The plaintiffs were given until July 26, 1974 to amend their pleadings.

The case is continued until further orders.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
COVINGTON

CIVIL NO. 1752

COVINGTON HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL — PLAINTIFFS

v.

CITY OF COVINGTON, ET AL — DEFENDANTS

ORDER

It is ordered and adjudged herein as follows:

1) That the motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Grimm, Sageser, Bowman, Wermeling, Simpson, Royster, Hedrick, and Wolfe, be and the same hereby is sustained;

2) That the complaint be and the same hereby is dismissed at the cost of the plaintiff, Eddie Thompson, Jr.

See Memorandum.

September 11, 1974 — /s/ Mac Swinford, Judge

(Retyped Copy)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
COVINGTON

CIVIL NO. 1752

COVINGTON HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL — PLAINTIFFS

v.

CITY OF COVINGTON, ET AL — DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM

The complaint in this civil rights action commenced by the Covington Housing Development Corporation and its executive director alleges that on October 5, 1972, the corporation contracted with the City of Covington for the development of residential areas under the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act, 42 U.S.C. 3301, et seq. Because the executive director of the Authority was a Negro, city officials deliberately misrepresented certain facts to the department of Housing and Urban Development in a successful attempt to halt further funding to the project. The corporation alternately seeks damages or reinstatement of the development, while Thompson demands renumeration for the defendants' racist hiring practices and defamatory allegations of fiscal irresponsibility.

Orders entered on December 18, 1973, and June 27, 1974, directed the dismissal of the complaint as to the City of Covington and certain federal officials. The record is now before the court on the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that Thompson lacks the capacity to sue in the name of the Covington Housing Development Corporation. It is contrarily asserted that the plaintiff's power

to initiate this action is derived from his managerial position as reflected in governing statutes and corporate records; that several directors informally agreed to the commencement of this action; and that the corporation has ratified Thompson's action. An examination of the cited standards compels dismissal of the complaint.

The plaintiff's assertion of an inherent authority to institute this action in the name of the entity reveals a fallacious interpretation of both the corporate records and the legal principles outlining the extent of a manager's authority. Kentucky law vests control over corporate affairs in a board of directors, "except as may be otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation." K.R.S. 271A.175.1 The board may in turn delegate a portion of its decisionmaking authority to responsible corporate officers:

> "All officers and agents of the corporation, as between themselves and the corporation, shall have such authority and perform such duties in the management of the corporation as may be provided in the bylaws, or as may be determined by resolution of the board of directors not inconsistent with the bylaws." K.R.S. 271A. 250 (2).

1 Although incorporated under K.R.S. Chapter 273, the provisions of Chapter 271A are applicable to "any corporation of that kind either are inconsistent with this chapter or state that the provisions of this chapter do not apply to it." K.R.S. 271A.015(1).

Article III. The responsibilities of the executive director are thus enunciated in the corporation's bylaws:

> "The Executive Director shall be the Chief Executive Officer of the corporation. He hall have custody of the Corporation funds and securities and shall keep full and accurate accounts of receipts and disbursements in books belonging to the Corporation. He shall deposit all monies and other valuable effects in the name, and to the credit of the corporation in such depositories as may from time to time be designated by the Board of Directors. He shall have all of the general powers and juties which are usually vested in the office of Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation." Article V, Section 4.

While the executive director is not expressly denied the authority to institute legal proceedings, the court is cited to no articles, bylaw or resolution vesting such responsibility in the plaintiff.

> "Authority to bind the corporation must come either from the by-laws or the board of directors, or the action of the officer must be of the nature that co-es within the apparent scope of his employment. . . . The mere representations of a claimed agent, even when coupled with signing a paper in such capacity, are not sufficient to show his agency or the extent therof." Har-Bel Coal Company v. Asher Coal Mining Company, supra at 130.

Muir v. Glassbrenner Motors Company, 211 Ky. 1, 4 (1925); Caddy Oil Co. v. Sommer, 186 Ky. 843, 847 (1920). The depositions and interrogatories of other participants in the operation reveal that the executive director was at no time vested with the authority to commence litigation; indeed, the corporate minutes strongly suggest that Thompson was not even a company official at the time this action was initiated.

While a managing director enjoys a broad range of commercial responsibility, the court is unaware of any decision construing in such inherent control the right to commence litigation of this magnitude. Rather, it is well settled that a manager's authority is limited to the conduct of ordinary business affairs:

> "(T)he general business of corporations is frequently entrusted to the management of a general manager. . ., who has the power to bind the corporation by acts within the scope of his apparent authority. Such authority is not limited by the fact that the general manager is also the president or other officer of the the corporation, for it is not incident to such other office, but is incident to the management of the business. . . . He has been deemed by numerous authorities to be the principal officer of the corporation, having general charge of those business matters for the carrying on of which the company was incorporated, and he has the implied or ostensible power to do any act which is usual or necessary in the ordinary transaction of the company's business." 19 Am.Jur. 2d "Corporations" Section 1174, p. 599.

See also Gaddie v. Collins of Kentucky, Ky., 248 S.W. 2d 722, 723 (1952). The powers implied in such a governing director typically include: consummating contracts incidental to corporate operations; procurement of equipment; employing and supervising employees in such a governing director typically include: consummating contracts incidental to corporate operations; procurement of equipment; employing and supervising employees in the course of business; selling goods; receiving payment of accounts; and directing the ordinary affairs of the business. Restatement, Second, Agency, Section 73. The frequently added authority to commence necessary litigation, see Custer Channel Wing Corporation v. Frazer, S.D. N.Y.,

181 F. Supp. 197 (1959); Annot.,10 A.L.R. 2d 701; contra Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount pictures, S. D. N.Y., 107 F. Supp. 532, 538 (1952), is subject to the same limitations attending the manager's other functions: "the authority. . . is normally restricted to litigation incidental to the regular course of the corporation's business." Note, 50 Ky. L.J. 92 (1961): see Ky. Penn. Oil & Gas Corp. v. Clark, 247 Ky. 438, 450-451 (1933); Rasnick v. W.M. Ritter Lumber Co., 187 Ky. 523 (1920). Even this circumscribed power is negated in the event of inernal corporate dissension regarding the propriety of suit. See Contee Construction Co. v. Cay Construction Co., Fla., 221 So. 2d 792 (1969); Note, 50 Ky. L.J. 92 (1961). Thompson's Litigation relates not to ordinary business affairs but is an extraordinary attempt to revive an enterprise which the board of directors ordered terminated on March 16, 1973.

The conclusion that the plaintiff acquired no inherent power to initiate this action is buttressed by Kentucky decisions narrowly defining the functions exercisable by a single officer. Thus, the court in Caddy Oil Co. v. Sommer, 186 Ky. at 847, ruled that a president's general administrative authority did not embrace the right to contract for the sale of corporate property; "(t)his . . .authority is . . .limited and governed by the character of business, in which the corporation is engaged." Banco Ky. Co's Rec'r v. Nat'l Bk. of Ky.'s Rec'r, 281 Ky. 784 (1939); Empire Coal Mining Co. v. Empire Coal Co., 183 Ky. 699 (1919); see also Burley Tobacco Co. v. Vest, 165 Ky. 762 (1915).

Similarly, The expansive power "to transact all kinds of business". does not authorize a general manager to sell corporate property or bind the company to a contract unconnected with the business of the enterprise. Elk Valley Coal Company v. Thompson, 150 Ky. 614 (1912).

The plaintiff's reliance upon an informally granted authority to commence this litigation ignores the "well settled doctrine that a corporation can act only through its directors at an official meeting regularly held, and that its acts can be proven only by the records of such meeting." Bastin v. Givens, Admx., 170 Ky. 201, 205 (1916); Clay v. Mt. Holly Development Company, Ky., 464 S.W. 2d 621, 624 (1971); Star Mills v. Bailey, 140 Ky.194 (1910). See also Paducah Newspapers, Inc. V. Goodman, 251 Ky. 754 (1933); Kozy Theatre Company v. Love, 191 Ky. 595, 601-602 (1921); a business will not be bound by agreements secured among isolated directors. Caddy Oil Company v. Sommer, 186 Ky. at 847; see 19 Am.Jur. 2d "Corporations", Section 1157. The claimed ratification of Thompson's decision to sue is similarly unsupported by any suggestion of express or implicit approval of the plaintiff's action; see Tarrants v. Henderson County Farm Bureau, Ky., 380 S.W. 2d 274, 277 (1964); Catlettsburg & Buchannan Telephone Co. v. Bond, 262 Ky. 106, 108 (1936); Harlan, Etc., Co. v. Eastern Construction Co., 254 Ky. 135, 145 (1934); Paducah Newspapers, Inc. v. Goodman, 251 Ky. at 758-759.

A finding that the corporate plaintiff is not properly a party to this action compels a secondary determination whether the action should be dismissed or retained for resolution of the claims proffered by the individual plaintiff. It is initially apparent that Thompson has no personal remedy for injuries suffered by the Covington Housing Development Corporation.

See Mullins v. First National Exchange Bank of Virginaia, W. D. Va., 275 F. Supp. 712, 721 (1967). Further, the deprivations allegedly inflicted upon the plaintiff individually are insufficient to justify retention of jurisdiction: the slanderous utterances on the part of the defendants do not evoke a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1981, et seq; Azar v. Conley, 6th Cir., 456 F. 2d 1382, 1389 (1972); Church v. Hamilton, 3d Cir.,444 F. 2d 105, 106 (1971); Hopkins v. Wasson, E.D. Tenn., 227 F. Supp. 278, 281 (1962), aff'd 6th Cir., 329 F. 2d 67 (1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 854 (1964). The reference to discriminatory hiring is unsupported by factual allegations, Fletcher v. Hook, 3d Cir., 446 F. 2d 14 (1971); Guedry v. Ford, 5th Cir., 431 F. 2d 660 (1970), and of doubtful merit in view of the plaintiff's continued status with the housing authority.

An order will be entered sustaining the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissing the complaint.

September 11, 1974 /s/ Mac Swinford, Judge

(Retyped Copy)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
COVINGTON

NO. 1752

COVINGTON HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL — PLAINTIFFS

V.

CITY OF COVINGTON, ET AL — DEFENDANTS

ORDER

The order of this court, entered on september 11, 1974, on a finding that a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants was sustained, failed to state the names of the defendants, Joseph T. Condit and Bill L. Woods, who had filed a separate motion for summary judgment on August 8, 1974.

The order of September 11, 1974 is hereby amended to include among the named defendants set forth in the order the name of Joseph T. Condit and Bill L. Woods.

September 13, 1974 — /s/ Mac Swinford, Judge
(Retyped Copy)

No. 74-2196

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

COVINGTON HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, A Kentucky Corporation
EDDIE THOMPSON, JR.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CITY OF COVINGTON, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

APPEAL from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky.

Decided and Filed April 23, 1975.

Before: PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, McCREE and LIVELY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. This is an appeal from an order dismissing a complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 to redress discrimination alleged to have been practiced by the City of Covington and certain of its officials in connection with the development of residential areas under the Demonstation Cities and Metropolitan Development Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3301, et seq. The action against the City of Covington was dismissed in an earlier order from which an appeal was not taken on the ground that a municipality is not a person for the purposes of these Civil Rights Acts. The action was brought by Eddie Thompson, a Negro, who is the executive director of the Covington Housing Development Corporation

(HDC) and in behalf of the corporation. The summary judgment dismissing the action determined that the corporate plaintiff was not properly a party because its directors had not authorized the executive director to initiate the action. The district court also dismissed the action against Thompson on the ground that his reference to discriminatory hiring was unsupported by factual allegations.

The district court correctly held that the individual plaintiff Thompson was not authorized to initiate or prosecute this action on behalf of his corporate employer. The record discloses no direction to sue or consent by the board of directors of HDC to this suit on behalf of the corporation by Thompson.

In the complaint Thompson also sought relief for violation of his civil rights. He may not recover personally for wrongs allegedly suffered by the corporation which he directed. He and the corporation are separate beings in the eyes of the law. We have carefully searched the record for evidence that the civil rights of the plaintiff Thompson have been infringed by any of the defendants-appellees and have found none. The district court had no jurisdiction over claims of slander by the defendants or injury to Thompson's reputation. It could only consider infringement of rights protected by the United States Constitution or the Civil Rights Act under which this action was brought, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Our review of the record leads to the conclusion that no showing of such infringement was made, and that the defendants were entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law. Under these circumstances summary judgment was properly granted.

Affirmed. No costs on appeal.

NO. 74-2196

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

COVINGTON HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
A Kentucky Corporation
EDDIE THOMPSON, JR.

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

CITY OF COVINTON' et al.

Defendants-Appellees

ORDER

BEFORE: PHILLIPS, Chief judge, McCREE and LIVELY, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff-appellants' petition for rehearing with a suggestion for rehearing en banc having come on for consideration and less than a majority of the judges having favored consideration en banc, the petition has been referred to the original panel.

Upon consideration of the petition for rehearing, the court concludes that the issues raised therin were fully considered prior to the initial disposition of the case. Accordingly, the petition for rehearing is denied.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Filed June 5, 1975
(Retyped Copy)

Clerk /s/ John P. Hehman